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security/wpa_supplicant: Update to version 2.6 and patch for LibreSSL support
Port changes: - Remove patches that have been incorporated upstream - Add patches for LibreSSL support Approved by: AMDmi3 (mentor) Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8451
This commit is contained in:
Joseph Mingrone
parent
672a066c57
commit
f453d7ba20
Notes:
svn2git
2021-03-31 03:12:20 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=426292
15 changed files with 76 additions and 613 deletions
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@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
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# $FreeBSD$
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PORTNAME= wpa_supplicant
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PORTVERSION= 2.5
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PORTREVISION= 2
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PORTVERSION= 2.6
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CATEGORIES= security net
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MASTER_SITES= http://w1.fi/releases/
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@ -96,15 +95,22 @@ PRIVSEP_PLIST_FILES= sbin/wpa_priv
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.include <bsd.port.options.mk>
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.if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MNDIS} && ${PORT_OPTIONS:MPRIVSEP}
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BROKEN= Fails to compile with both NDIS and PRIVSEP
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.endif
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.if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MIEEE80211AC} && ${PORT_OPTIONS:MIEEE80211N}
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BROKEN= Fails to compile with both IEEE80211AC and IEEE80211N
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.endif
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.if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MSIM} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MAKA} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MAKA_PRIME}
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LIB_DEPENDS+= libpcsclite.so:devel/pcsc-lite
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CFLAGS+= -I${LOCALBASE}/include/PCSC
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LDFLAGS+= -L${LOCALBASE}/lib
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.endif
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post-patch:
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${CP} ${FILESDIR}/Packet32.[ch] ${FILESDIR}/ntddndis.h \
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@${CP} ${FILESDIR}/Packet32.[ch] ${FILESDIR}/ntddndis.h \
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${WRKSRC}/src/utils
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# Set driver(s)
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.for item in BSD NDIS WIRED ROBOSWITCH TEST NONE
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@ -157,12 +163,12 @@ do-install:
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${INSTALL_DATA} ${BUILD_WRKSRC}/wpa_supplicant.conf \
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${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf.sample
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do-install-PRIVSEP-on:
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${INSTALL_PROGRAM} ${BUILD_WRKSRC}/wpa_priv ${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/sbin
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do-install-DOCS-on:
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@${MKDIR} ${STAGEDIR}${DOCSDIR}
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(cd ${BUILD_WRKSRC} && \
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${INSTALL_DATA} ${PORTDOCS} ${STAGEDIR}${DOCSDIR})
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do-install-PRIVSEP-on:
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${INSTALL_PROGRAM} ${BUILD_WRKSRC}/wpa_priv ${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/sbin
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.include <bsd.port.mk>
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@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
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SHA256 (wpa_supplicant-2.5.tar.gz) = cce55bae483b364eae55c35ba567c279be442ed8bab5b80a3c7fb0d057b9b316
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SIZE (wpa_supplicant-2.5.tar.gz) = 2607336
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TIMESTAMP = 1478049569
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SHA256 (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450
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SIZE (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = 2753524
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@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
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From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no
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PMF in use
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WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is
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enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station
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side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
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--- wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
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+++ wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
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@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
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end = ptr + key_len_total;
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total);
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+ if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) {
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+ wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO,
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+ "WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled");
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+ return;
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+ }
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+
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while (ptr + 1 < end) {
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if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element "
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@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
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From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation
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All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
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room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
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fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
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The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
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buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
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termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++----
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
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--- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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+++ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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/*
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* buffer and ACK the fragment
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*/
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- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
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data->in_frag_pos += len;
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if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
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@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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return NULL;
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}
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wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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-
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+ }
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
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EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
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EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
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@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
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* we're buffering and this is the last fragment
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*/
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if (data->in_frag_pos) {
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- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
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(int) len);
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- data->in_frag_pos += len;
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pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
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len = data->in_frag_pos;
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}
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--
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1.9.1
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@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
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From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation
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All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
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room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
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fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
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The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
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buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
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termination. (CVE-2015-5314)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++---
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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--- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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+++ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
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@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
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/*
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* the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
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*/
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- if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
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if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
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"attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
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@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
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}
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wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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data->in_frag_pos += len;
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+ }
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+ if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment",
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(int) len);
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return;
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@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
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* buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
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*/
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if (data->in_frag_pos) {
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- wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
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- data->in_frag_pos += len;
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pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
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len = data->in_frag_pos;
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wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
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--
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1.9.1
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@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
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From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message
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If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity
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exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and
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data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange()
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did not take this corner case into account and could end up
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dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid
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message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316)
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
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---
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src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++-
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1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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--- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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+++ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
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@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
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wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
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fin:
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- bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
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+ if (data->grp)
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+ bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
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BN_clear_free(x);
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BN_clear_free(y);
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if (data->outbuf == NULL) {
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--
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1.9.1
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@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
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From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
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Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase
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WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
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characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as
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STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or
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WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase.
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This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated
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the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from
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an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should
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such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file
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could become invalid and fail to be parsed.
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Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
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---
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src/utils/common.c | 12 ++++++++++++
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src/utils/common.h | 1 +
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src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++
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3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
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--- src/utils/common.c
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+++ src/utils/common.c
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@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len)
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}
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+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
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+{
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+ size_t i;
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+
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+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
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+ if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127)
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+ return 1;
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+ }
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+ return 0;
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+}
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+
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+
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size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
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const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
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const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
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--- src/utils/common.h
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+++ src/utils/common.h
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@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
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char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
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int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
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+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
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size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
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const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
|
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const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len);
|
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--- src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
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+++ src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
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@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred)
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cred->key_len--;
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#endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */
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}
|
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+
|
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+
|
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+ if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) &&
|
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+ (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) {
|
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase");
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+ wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key",
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+ cred->key, cred->key_len);
|
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+ return -1;
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+ }
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+
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return 0;
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}
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--
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1.9.1
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|
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|
|
@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
|
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From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
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Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200
|
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Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase
|
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character
|
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|
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WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
|
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characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase
|
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includes an invalid passphrase.
|
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|
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This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
|
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configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control
|
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interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
|
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accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
|
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an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
|
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does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to
|
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wpa_supplicant.
|
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|
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This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of
|
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almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration
|
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file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g.,
|
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opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path,
|
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load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again.
|
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This would allow code from that library to be executed under the
|
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wpa_supplicant process privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
|
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1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
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--- wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
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+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
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@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data,
|
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}
|
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wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)",
|
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(u8 *) value, len);
|
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+ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) {
|
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+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
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+ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character",
|
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+ line);
|
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+ return -1;
|
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+ }
|
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if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len &&
|
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os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) {
|
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/* No change to the previously configured value */
|
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--
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1.9.1
|
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|
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|
|
@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
|
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From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
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From: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
|
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Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800
|
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Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network
|
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output
|
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|
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Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the
|
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wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block
|
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parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have
|
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been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control
|
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characters in the psk parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
|
||||
---
|
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src/utils/common.c | 11 +++++++++++
|
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src/utils/common.h | 1 +
|
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wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
|
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3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
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--- src/utils/common.c
|
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+++ src/utils/common.c
|
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@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
|
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}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+int has_newline(const char *str)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ while (*str) {
|
||||
+ if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r')
|
||||
+ return 1;
|
||||
+ str++;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ return 0;
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+
|
||||
size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
|
||||
--- src/utils/common.h
|
||||
+++ src/utils/common.h
|
||||
@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
|
||||
char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
|
||||
int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
|
||||
int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
|
||||
+int has_newline(const char *str);
|
||||
size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
|
||||
const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len);
|
||||
--- wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var)
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) {
|
||||
const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i];
|
||||
- if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0)
|
||||
- return field->writer(field, ssid);
|
||||
+ if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) {
|
||||
+ char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (ret && has_newline(ret)) {
|
||||
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
|
||||
+ "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it",
|
||||
+ var);
|
||||
+ os_free(ret);
|
||||
+ ret = NULL;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return ret;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
--
|
||||
1.9.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
|
|||
From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the
|
||||
string values
|
||||
|
||||
Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without
|
||||
filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value,
|
||||
unexpected configuration file data might be written.
|
||||
|
||||
This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
|
||||
configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control
|
||||
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
|
||||
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
|
||||
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
|
||||
does not validate the credential value before passing it to
|
||||
wpa_supplicant.
|
||||
|
||||
This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
|
||||
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
|
||||
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
|
||||
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
|
||||
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
|
||||
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
--- wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
|
||||
|
||||
if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 &&
|
||||
os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) {
|
||||
+ if (has_newline(value))
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
str_clear_free(cred->password);
|
||||
cred->password = os_strdup(value);
|
||||
cred->ext_password = 1;
|
||||
@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len);
|
||||
- if (val == NULL) {
|
||||
+ if (val == NULL ||
|
||||
+ (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 &&
|
||||
+ os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
|
||||
+ os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
|
||||
+ has_newline(val))) {
|
||||
wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string "
|
||||
"value '%s'.", line, var, value);
|
||||
+ os_free(val);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
1.9.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
|
|||
From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the
|
||||
string values
|
||||
|
||||
Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings
|
||||
without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the
|
||||
value, unexpected configuration file data might be written.
|
||||
|
||||
This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
|
||||
configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control
|
||||
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
|
||||
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
|
||||
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
|
||||
does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to
|
||||
wpa_supplicant.
|
||||
|
||||
This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
|
||||
into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
|
||||
wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
|
||||
pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
|
||||
controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
|
||||
library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
--- wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c
|
||||
@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data,
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (has_newline(pos)) {
|
||||
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline",
|
||||
+ line, data->name);
|
||||
+ return -1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
tmp = os_strdup(pos);
|
||||
if (tmp == NULL)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
--
|
||||
1.9.1
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
|||
--- src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c.orig 2016-11-02 18:04:18 UTC
|
||||
+++ src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
|
||||
@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ void crypto_cipher_deinit(struct crypto_
|
||||
|
||||
void * dh5_init(struct wpabuf **priv, struct wpabuf **publ)
|
||||
{
|
||||
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
|
||||
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
||||
DH *dh;
|
||||
struct wpabuf *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL;
|
||||
size_t publen, privlen;
|
||||
@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ err:
|
||||
|
||||
void * dh5_init_fixed(const struct wpabuf *priv, const struct wpabuf *publ)
|
||||
{
|
||||
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
|
||||
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
||||
DH *dh;
|
||||
|
||||
dh = DH_new();
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,67 +1,29 @@
|
|||
Compatibility fixes for LibreSSL
|
||||
|
||||
--- src/crypto/tls_openssl.c.orig 2015-09-27 19:02:05 UTC
|
||||
--- src/crypto/tls_openssl.c.orig 2016-11-02 18:46:25 UTC
|
||||
+++ src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
|
||||
@@ -2229,7 +2229,7 @@ static int tls_parse_pkcs12(struct tls_d
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (certs) {
|
||||
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L
|
||||
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
||||
SSL_clear_chain_certs(ssl);
|
||||
while ((cert = sk_X509_pop(certs)) != NULL) {
|
||||
X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf,
|
||||
@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ static int tls_parse_pkcs12(struct tls_d
|
||||
/* Try to continue anyway */
|
||||
@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ void * tls_init(const struct tls_config
|
||||
}
|
||||
sk_X509_free(certs);
|
||||
-#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
||||
+#if !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
||||
res = SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl,
|
||||
SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK |
|
||||
SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR);
|
||||
@@ -2812,7 +2812,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_random(void *ssl_
|
||||
if (conn == NULL || keys == NULL)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
ssl = conn->ssl;
|
||||
#endif /* OPENSSL_FIPS */
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */
|
||||
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
|
||||
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
||||
if (ssl == NULL || ssl->s3 == NULL || ssl->session == NULL)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
SSL_load_error_strings();
|
||||
SSL_library_init();
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
|
||||
@@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@ void tls_deinit(void *ssl_ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2841,7 +2841,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_random(void *ssl_
|
||||
#ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
|
||||
static int openssl_get_keyblock_size(SSL *ssl)
|
||||
{
|
||||
tls_openssl_ref_count--;
|
||||
if (tls_openssl_ref_count == 0) {
|
||||
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
|
||||
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
||||
const EVP_CIPHER *c;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *h;
|
||||
int md_size;
|
||||
@@ -2911,7 +2911,7 @@ static int openssl_tls_prf(struct tls_co
|
||||
"mode");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
#else /* CONFIG_FIPS */
|
||||
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
|
||||
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
||||
SSL *ssl;
|
||||
u8 *rnd;
|
||||
int ret = -1;
|
||||
@@ -3394,7 +3394,7 @@ int tls_connection_set_cipher_list(void
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
||||
ENGINE_cleanup();
|
||||
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
|
||||
@@ -3976,7 +3976,7 @@ int tls_connection_set_params(void *tls_
|
||||
engine_id = "pkcs11";
|
||||
|
||||
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: cipher suites: %s", buf + 1);
|
||||
|
||||
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
|
||||
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
||||
#if defined(EAP_FAST) || defined(EAP_FAST_DYNAMIC) || defined(EAP_SERVER_FAST)
|
||||
if (os_strstr(buf, ":ADH-")) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@@ -3977,7 +3977,7 @@ static int tls_sess_sec_cb(SSL *s, void
|
||||
struct tls_connection *conn = arg;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
|
||||
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
||||
if (conn == NULL || conn->session_ticket_cb == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_EAP_FAST) {
|
||||
wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
|
||||
"OpenSSL: Use TLSv1_method() for EAP-FAST");
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
|
|||
--- src/utils/os_unix.c.orig 2015-09-27 19:02:05 UTC
|
||||
+++ src/utils/os_unix.c
|
||||
@@ -214,17 +214,42 @@ static int os_daemon(int nochdir, int no
|
||||
#define os_daemon daemon
|
||||
#endif /* __APPLE__ */
|
||||
|
||||
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__)
|
||||
+#define FREE_DRAGON
|
||||
+#include <err.h>
|
||||
+#include <libutil.h>
|
||||
+#include <stdint.h>
|
||||
+#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __DragonFly__ */
|
||||
|
||||
int os_daemonize(const char *pid_file)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#if defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
#else /* defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__) */
|
||||
+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON
|
||||
+ pid_t otherpid;
|
||||
+ struct pidfh *pfh;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ pfh = pidfile_open(pid_file, 0600, &otherpid);
|
||||
+ if (pfh == NULL) {
|
||||
+ if (errno == EEXIST) {
|
||||
+ errx(1, "Daemon already running, pid: %jd.",
|
||||
+ (intmax_t)otherpid);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ warn("Cannot open or create pidfile.");
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+#endif /* FREE_DRAGON */
|
||||
if (os_daemon(0, 0)) {
|
||||
perror("daemon");
|
||||
+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON
|
||||
+ pidfile_remove(pfh);
|
||||
+#endif /* FREE_DRAGON */
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON
|
||||
+ pidfile_write(pfh);
|
||||
+#else
|
||||
if (pid_file) {
|
||||
FILE *f = fopen(pid_file, "w");
|
||||
if (f) {
|
||||
@@ -232,6 +257,7 @@ int os_daemonize(const char *pid_file)
|
||||
fclose(f);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+#endif /* FREE_DRAGON */
|
||||
|
||||
return -0;
|
||||
#endif /* defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__) */
|
||||
@@ -384,7 +410,7 @@ int os_setenv(const char *name, const ch
|
||||
|
||||
int os_unsetenv(const char *name)
|
||||
{
|
||||
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__) || \
|
||||
+#if defined(FREE_DRAGON) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__) || \
|
||||
defined(__OpenBSD__)
|
||||
unsetenv(name);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
@@ -445,7 +471,9 @@ int os_file_exists(const char *fname)
|
||||
int os_fdatasync(FILE *stream)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!fflush(stream)) {
|
||||
-#ifndef __MACH__
|
||||
+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON
|
||||
+ return fsync(fileno(stream));
|
||||
+#elif !defined __MACH__
|
||||
return fdatasync(fileno(stream));
|
||||
#else /* __MACH__ */
|
||||
#ifdef F_FULLFSYNC
|
||||
|
|
@ -1,6 +1,25 @@
|
|||
--- wpa_supplicant/main.c.orig 2015-03-15 17:30:39 UTC
|
||||
--- wpa_supplicant/main.c.orig 2016-11-05 20:56:30 UTC
|
||||
+++ wpa_supplicant/main.c
|
||||
@@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static void usage(void)
|
||||
" -c = Configuration file\n"
|
||||
" -C = ctrl_interface parameter (only used if -c is not)\n"
|
||||
" -d = increase debugging verbosity (-dd even more)\n"
|
||||
- " -D = driver name (can be multiple drivers: nl80211,wext)\n"
|
||||
+ " -D = driver name (can be multiple drivers: bsd,wired)\n"
|
||||
" -e = entropy file\n"
|
||||
#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE
|
||||
" -f = log output to debug file instead of stdout\n"
|
||||
@@ -105,8 +105,7 @@ static void usage(void)
|
||||
" -W = wait for a control interface monitor before starting\n");
|
||||
|
||||
printf("example:\n"
|
||||
- " wpa_supplicant -D%s -iwlan0 -c/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf\n",
|
||||
- wpa_drivers[0] ? wpa_drivers[0]->name : "nl80211");
|
||||
+ " wpa_supplicant -Dbsd -iwlan0 -c/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf\n");
|
||||
#endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -199,6 +198,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
|
||||
wpa_supplicant_fd_workaround(1);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -11,4 +30,4 @@
|
|||
+
|
||||
for (;;) {
|
||||
c = getopt(argc, argv,
|
||||
"b:Bc:C:D:de:f:g:G:hi:I:KLm:No:O:p:P:qsTtuvW");
|
||||
"b:Bc:C:D:de:f:g:G:hi:I:KLMm:No:O:p:P:qsTtuvW");
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue