ports/security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_2-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha
John Marino 5c93ecbe9e security/wpa_supplicant: Add security patch set 2016-1
A vulnerability was found in how hostapd and wpa_supplicant writes the
configuration file update for the WPA/WPA2 passphrase parameter. If this
parameter has been updated to include control characters either through
a WPS operation (CVE-2016-4476) or through local configuration change
over the wpa_supplicant control interface (CVE-2016-4477), the resulting
configuration file may prevent the hostapd and wpa_supplicant from
starting when the updated file is used. In addition for wpa_supplicant,
it may be possible to load a local library file and execute code from
there with the same privileges under which the wpa_supplicant process
runs.

These patches were developed upstream and published as a response
to the security advisories CVE-2016-4476 and CVE-2016-4477.

PR:		209564
Requested by:	Sevan Janiyan
2016-05-19 21:12:07 +00:00

49 lines
1.9 KiB
Text

From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase
character
WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase
includes an invalid passphrase.
This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control
interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to
wpa_supplicant.
This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of
almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration
file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g.,
opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path,
load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again.
This would allow code from that library to be executed under the
wpa_supplicant process privileges.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
---
wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
--- wpa_supplicant/config.c
+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c
@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data,
}
wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)",
(u8 *) value, len);
+ if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) {
+ wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
+ "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character",
+ line);
+ return -1;
+ }
if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len &&
os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) {
/* No change to the previously configured value */
--
1.9.1