security/wpa_supplicant: Update to version 2.6 and patch for LibreSSL support

Port changes:
- Remove patches that have been incorporated upstream
- Add patches for LibreSSL support

Approved by:	AMDmi3 (mentor)
Differential Revision:	https://reviews.freebsd.org/D8451

security/wpa_supplicant/Makefile

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 # $FreeBSD$
 
 PORTNAME=	wpa_supplicant
-PORTVERSION=	2.5
+PORTVERSION=	2.6
-PORTREVISION=	2
 CATEGORIES=	security net
 MASTER_SITES=	http://w1.fi/releases/
 
@@ -96,15 +95,22 @@ PRIVSEP_PLIST_FILES=	sbin/wpa_priv
 
 .include <bsd.port.options.mk>
 
+.if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MNDIS} && ${PORT_OPTIONS:MPRIVSEP}
+BROKEN=	Fails to compile with both NDIS and PRIVSEP
+.endif
+
+.if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MIEEE80211AC} && ${PORT_OPTIONS:MIEEE80211N}
+BROKEN=	Fails to compile with both IEEE80211AC and IEEE80211N
+.endif
+
 .if ${PORT_OPTIONS:MSIM} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MAKA} || ${PORT_OPTIONS:MAKA_PRIME}
 LIB_DEPENDS+=	libpcsclite.so:devel/pcsc-lite
 CFLAGS+=	-I${LOCALBASE}/include/PCSC
 LDFLAGS+=	-L${LOCALBASE}/lib
 .endif
 
-
 post-patch:
-	${CP} ${FILESDIR}/Packet32.[ch] ${FILESDIR}/ntddndis.h \
+	@${CP} ${FILESDIR}/Packet32.[ch] ${FILESDIR}/ntddndis.h \
 		${WRKSRC}/src/utils
 	# Set driver(s)
 .for item in BSD NDIS WIRED ROBOSWITCH TEST NONE
@@ -157,12 +163,12 @@ do-install:
 	${INSTALL_DATA} ${BUILD_WRKSRC}/wpa_supplicant.conf \
 		${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf.sample
 
-do-install-PRIVSEP-on:
-	${INSTALL_PROGRAM} ${BUILD_WRKSRC}/wpa_priv ${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/sbin
-
 do-install-DOCS-on:
 	@${MKDIR} ${STAGEDIR}${DOCSDIR}
 	(cd ${BUILD_WRKSRC} && \
 		${INSTALL_DATA} ${PORTDOCS} ${STAGEDIR}${DOCSDIR})
 
+do-install-PRIVSEP-on:
+	${INSTALL_PROGRAM} ${BUILD_WRKSRC}/wpa_priv ${STAGEDIR}${PREFIX}/sbin
+
 .include <bsd.port.mk>

security/wpa_supplicant/distinfo

@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
-SHA256 (wpa_supplicant-2.5.tar.gz) = cce55bae483b364eae55c35ba567c279be442ed8bab5b80a3c7fb0d057b9b316
+TIMESTAMP = 1478049569
-SIZE (wpa_supplicant-2.5.tar.gz) = 2607336
+SHA256 (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = b4936d34c4e6cdd44954beba74296d964bc2c9668ecaa5255e499636fe2b1450
+SIZE (wpa_supplicant-2.6.tar.gz) = 2753524

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-6-backported-WNM-Ignore-Key-Data-in-WNM-Sleep-Mode-Response-frame

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From 6b12d93d2c7428a34bfd4b3813ba339ed57b698a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 25 Oct 2015 15:45:50 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM Sleep Mode Response frame if no
- PMF in use
-
-WNM Sleep Mode Response frame is used to update GTK/IGTK only if PMF is
-enabled. Verify that PMF is in use before using this field on station
-side to avoid accepting unauthenticated key updates. (CVE-2015-5310)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
---- wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-+++ wpa_supplicant/wnm_sta.c
-@@ -187,6 +187,12 @@ static void wnm_sleep_mode_exit_success(struct wpa_supplicant *wpa_s,
- 	end = ptr + key_len_total;
- 	wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Key Data", ptr, key_len_total);
- 
-+	if (key_len_total && !wpa_sm_pmf_enabled(wpa_s->wpa)) {
-+		wpa_msg(wpa_s, MSG_INFO,
-+			"WNM: Ignore Key Data in WNM-Sleep Mode Response - PMF not enabled");
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
- 	while (ptr + 1 < end) {
- 		if (ptr + 2 + ptr[1] > end) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "WNM: Invalid Key Data element "

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-From 8057821706784608b828e769ccefbced95591e50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:18:17 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix last fragment length validation
-
-All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
-room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
-fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
-The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
-buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
-termination. (CVE-2015-5315)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 7 +++----
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
---- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -903,7 +903,7 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	/*
- 	 * buffer and ACK the fragment
- 	 */
--	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
- 		data->in_frag_pos += len;
- 		if (data->in_frag_pos > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow attack "
-@@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 			return NULL;
- 		}
- 		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
--
-+	}
-+	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
- 		resp = eap_msg_alloc(EAP_VENDOR_IETF, EAP_TYPE_PWD,
- 				     EAP_PWD_HDR_SIZE,
- 				     EAP_CODE_RESPONSE, eap_get_id(reqData));
-@@ -930,10 +931,8 @@ eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, struct eap_method_ret *ret,
- 	 * we're buffering and this is the last fragment
- 	 */
- 	if (data->in_frag_pos) {
--		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
- 			   (int) len);
--		data->in_frag_pos += len;
- 		pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
- 		len = data->in_frag_pos;
- 	}
--- 
-1.9.1
-

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-7-EAP-pwd-server-Fix-last-fragment-length-validation

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From bef802ece03f9ae9d52a21f0cf4f1bc2c5a1f8aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 18:24:16 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd server: Fix last fragment length validation
-
-All but the last fragment had their length checked against the remaining
-room in the reassembly buffer. This allowed a suitably constructed last
-fragment frame to try to add extra data that would go beyond the buffer.
-The length validation code in wpabuf_put_data() prevents an actual
-buffer write overflow from occurring, but this results in process
-termination. (CVE-2015-5314)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
---- src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-+++ src/eap_server/eap_server_pwd.c
-@@ -970,7 +970,7 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- 	/*
- 	 * the first and all intermediate fragments have the M bit set
- 	 */
--	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
-+	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch) || data->in_frag_pos) {
- 		if ((data->in_frag_pos + len) > wpabuf_size(data->inbuf)) {
- 			wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Buffer overflow "
- 				   "attack detected! (%d+%d > %d)",
-@@ -981,6 +981,8 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- 		}
- 		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
- 		data->in_frag_pos += len;
-+	}
-+	if (EAP_PWD_GET_MORE_BIT(lm_exch)) {
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Got a %d byte fragment",
- 			   (int) len);
- 		return;
-@@ -990,8 +992,6 @@ static void eap_pwd_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- 	 * buffering fragments so that's how we know it's the last)
- 	 */
- 	if (data->in_frag_pos) {
--		wpabuf_put_data(data->inbuf, pos, len);
--		data->in_frag_pos += len;
- 		pos = wpabuf_head_u8(data->inbuf);
- 		len = data->in_frag_pos;
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-pwd: Last fragment, %d bytes",
--- 
-1.9.1
-

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2015-8-EAP-pwd-peer-Fix-error-path-for-unexpected-Confirm-m

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-From 95577884ca4fa76be91344ff7a8d5d1e6dc3da61 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
-Date: Sun, 1 Nov 2015 19:35:44 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] EAP-pwd peer: Fix error path for unexpected Confirm message
-
-If the Confirm message is received from the server before the Identity
-exchange has been completed, the group has not yet been determined and
-data->grp is NULL. The error path in eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange()
-did not take this corner case into account and could end up
-dereferencing a NULL pointer and terminating the process if invalid
-message sequence is received. (CVE-2015-5316)
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-+++ src/eap_peer/eap_pwd.c
-@@ -774,7 +774,8 @@ eap_pwd_perform_confirm_exchange(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_pwd_data *data,
- 	wpabuf_put_data(data->outbuf, conf, SHA256_MAC_LEN);
- 
- fin:
--	bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
-+	if (data->grp)
-+		bin_clear_free(cruft, BN_num_bytes(data->grp->prime));
- 	BN_clear_free(x);
- 	BN_clear_free(y);
- 	if (data->outbuf == NULL) {
--- 
-1.9.1
-

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_1-WPS-Reject-a-Credential-with-invalid-passphrase

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From ecbb0b3dc122b0d290987cf9c84010bbe53e1022 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 17:20:18 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/5] WPS: Reject a Credential with invalid passphrase
-
-WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
-characters. Reject a Credential received from a WPS Registrar both as
-STA (Credential) and AP (AP Settings) if the credential is for WPAPSK or
-WPA2PSK authentication type and includes an invalid passphrase.
-
-This fixes an issue where hostapd or wpa_supplicant could have updated
-the configuration file PSK/passphrase parameter with arbitrary data from
-an external device (Registrar) that may not be fully trusted. Should
-such data include a newline character, the resulting configuration file
-could become invalid and fail to be parsed.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- src/utils/common.c         | 12 ++++++++++++
- src/utils/common.h         |  1 +
- src/wps/wps_attr_process.c | 10 ++++++++++
- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
-
---- src/utils/common.c
-+++ src/utils/common.c
-@@ -697,6 +697,18 @@ int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len)
- }
- 
- 
-+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
-+{
-+	size_t i;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
-+		if (data[i] < 32 || data[i] == 127)
-+			return 1;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
- 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
- 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
---- src/utils/common.h
-+++ src/utils/common.h
-@@ -488,6 +488,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
- 
- char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
- int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
-+int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
- size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
- 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
- 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len);
---- src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
-+++ src/wps/wps_attr_process.c
-@@ -229,6 +229,16 @@ static int wps_workaround_cred_key(struct wps_credential *cred)
- 		cred->key_len--;
- #endif /* CONFIG_WPS_STRICT */
- 	}
-+
-+
-+	if (cred->auth_type & (WPS_AUTH_WPAPSK | WPS_AUTH_WPA2PSK) &&
-+	    (cred->key_len < 8 || has_ctrl_char(cred->key, cred->key_len))) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Reject credential with invalid WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase");
-+		wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_INFO, "WPS: Network Key",
-+				      cred->key, cred->key_len);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--- 
-1.9.1
-

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_2-Reject-psk-parameter-set-with-invalid-passphrase-cha

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From 73e4abb24a936014727924d8b0b2965edfc117dd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Fri, 4 Mar 2016 18:46:41 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/5] Reject psk parameter set with invalid passphrase
- character
-
-WPA/WPA2-Personal passphrase is not allowed to include control
-characters. Reject a passphrase configuration attempt if that passphrase
-includes an invalid passphrase.
-
-This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
-configuration file psk parameter with arbitrary data from the control
-interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
-accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
-an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
-does not validate the passphrase value before passing it to
-wpa_supplicant.
-
-This could allow such an untrusted user to inject up to 63 characters of
-almost arbitrary data into the configuration file. Such configuration
-file could result in wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g.,
-opensc_engine_path, pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path,
-load_dynamic_eap) from user controlled location when starting again.
-This would allow code from that library to be executed under the
-wpa_supplicant process privileges.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
---- wpa_supplicant/config.c
-+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c
-@@ -478,6 +478,12 @@ static int wpa_config_parse_psk(const struct parse_data *data,
- 		}
- 		wpa_hexdump_ascii_key(MSG_MSGDUMP, "PSK (ASCII passphrase)",
- 				      (u8 *) value, len);
-+		if (has_ctrl_char((u8 *) value, len)) {
-+			wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
-+				   "Line %d: Invalid passphrase character",
-+				   line);
-+			return -1;
-+		}
- 		if (ssid->passphrase && os_strlen(ssid->passphrase) == len &&
- 		    os_memcmp(ssid->passphrase, value, len) == 0) {
- 			/* No change to the previously configured value */
--- 
-1.9.1
-

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_3-Remove-newlines-from-wpa_supplicant-config-network-o

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-From 0fe5a234240a108b294a87174ad197f6b5cb38e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
-Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2016 15:40:19 -0800
-Subject: [PATCH 3/5] Remove newlines from wpa_supplicant config network
- output
-
-Spurious newlines output while writing the config file can corrupt the
-wpa_supplicant configuration. Avoid writing these for the network block
-parameters. This is a generic filter that cover cases that may not have
-been explicitly addressed with a more specific commit to avoid control
-characters in the psk parameter.
-
-Signed-off-by: Paul Stewart <pstew@google.com>
----
- src/utils/common.c      | 11 +++++++++++
- src/utils/common.h      |  1 +
- wpa_supplicant/config.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- src/utils/common.c
-+++ src/utils/common.c
-@@ -709,6 +709,17 @@ int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len)
- }
- 
- 
-+int has_newline(const char *str)
-+{
-+	while (*str) {
-+		if (*str == '\n' || *str == '\r')
-+			return 1;
-+		str++;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+
- size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
- 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
- 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len)
---- src/utils/common.h
-+++ src/utils/common.h
-@@ -489,6 +489,7 @@ const char * wpa_ssid_txt(const u8 *ssid, size_t ssid_len);
- char * wpa_config_parse_string(const char *value, size_t *len);
- int is_hex(const u8 *data, size_t len);
- int has_ctrl_char(const u8 *data, size_t len);
-+int has_newline(const char *str);
- size_t merge_byte_arrays(u8 *res, size_t res_len,
- 			 const u8 *src1, size_t src1_len,
- 			 const u8 *src2, size_t src2_len);
---- wpa_supplicant/config.c
-+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c
-@@ -2699,8 +2699,19 @@ char * wpa_config_get(struct wpa_ssid *ssid, const char *var)
- 
- 	for (i = 0; i < NUM_SSID_FIELDS; i++) {
- 		const struct parse_data *field = &ssid_fields[i];
--		if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0)
--			return field->writer(field, ssid);
-+		if (os_strcmp(var, field->name) == 0) {
-+			char *ret = field->writer(field, ssid);
-+
-+			if (ret && has_newline(ret)) {
-+				wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR,
-+					   "Found newline in value for %s; not returning it",
-+					   var);
-+				os_free(ret);
-+				ret = NULL;
-+			}
-+
-+			return ret;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	return NULL;
--- 
-1.9.1
-

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_4-Reject-SET_CRED-commands-with-newline-characters-in

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-From b166cd84a77a6717be9600bf95378a0055d6f5a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:33:10 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 4/5] Reject SET_CRED commands with newline characters in the
- string values
-
-Most of the cred block parameters are written as strings without
-filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the value,
-unexpected configuration file data might be written.
-
-This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
-configuration file cred parameter with arbitrary data from the control
-interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
-accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
-an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
-does not validate the credential value before passing it to
-wpa_supplicant.
-
-This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
-into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
-wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
-pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
-controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
-library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- wpa_supplicant/config.c | 9 ++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
---- wpa_supplicant/config.c
-+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c
-@@ -2896,6 +2896,8 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
- 
- 	if (os_strcmp(var, "password") == 0 &&
- 	    os_strncmp(value, "ext:", 4) == 0) {
-+		if (has_newline(value))
-+			return -1;
- 		str_clear_free(cred->password);
- 		cred->password = os_strdup(value);
- 		cred->ext_password = 1;
-@@ -2946,9 +2948,14 @@ int wpa_config_set_cred(struct wpa_cred *cred, const char *var,
- 	}
- 
- 	val = wpa_config_parse_string(value, &len);
--	if (val == NULL) {
-+	if (val == NULL ||
-+	    (os_strcmp(var, "excluded_ssid") != 0 &&
-+	     os_strcmp(var, "roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
-+	     os_strcmp(var, "required_roaming_consortium") != 0 &&
-+	     has_newline(val))) {
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid field '%s' string "
- 			   "value '%s'.", line, var, value);
-+		os_free(val);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
--- 
-1.9.1
-

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-2016_1_5-Reject-SET-commands-with-newline-characters-in-the-s

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-From 2a3f56502b52375c3bf113cf92adfa99bad6b488 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
-Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2016 23:55:48 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 5/5] Reject SET commands with newline characters in the
- string values
-
-Many of the global configuration parameters are written as strings
-without filtering and if there is an embedded newline character in the
-value, unexpected configuration file data might be written.
-
-This fixes an issue where wpa_supplicant could have updated the
-configuration file global parameter with arbitrary data from the control
-interface or D-Bus interface. While those interfaces are supposed to be
-accessible only for trusted users/applications, it may be possible that
-an untrusted user has access to a management software component that
-does not validate the value of a parameter before passing it to
-wpa_supplicant.
-
-This could allow such an untrusted user to inject almost arbitrary data
-into the configuration file. Such configuration file could result in
-wpa_supplicant trying to load a library (e.g., opensc_engine_path,
-pkcs11_engine_path, pkcs11_module_path, load_dynamic_eap) from user
-controlled location when starting again. This would allow code from that
-library to be executed under the wpa_supplicant process privileges.
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <jouni@qca.qualcomm.com>
----
- wpa_supplicant/config.c | 6 ++++++
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
-
---- wpa_supplicant/config.c
-+++ wpa_supplicant/config.c
-@@ -3764,6 +3764,12 @@ static int wpa_global_config_parse_str(const struct global_parse_data *data,
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (has_newline(pos)) {
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_ERROR, "Line %d: invalid %s value with newline",
-+			   line, data->name);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
- 	tmp = os_strdup(pos);
- 	if (tmp == NULL)
- 		return -1;
--- 
-1.9.1
-

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_crypto_crypto__openssl.c

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+--- src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c.orig	2016-11-02 18:04:18 UTC
++++ src/crypto/crypto_openssl.c
+@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ void crypto_cipher_deinit(struct crypto_
+ 
+ void * dh5_init(struct wpabuf **priv, struct wpabuf **publ)
+ {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ 	DH *dh;
+ 	struct wpabuf *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL;
+ 	size_t publen, privlen;
+@@ -712,7 +712,7 @@ err:
+ 
+ void * dh5_init_fixed(const struct wpabuf *priv, const struct wpabuf *publ)
+ {
+-#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
+ 	DH *dh;
+ 
+ 	dh = DH_new();

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_crypto_tls__openssl.c

@@ -1,67 +1,29 @@
-Compatibility fixes for LibreSSL
+--- src/crypto/tls_openssl.c.orig	2016-11-02 18:46:25 UTC
-
---- src/crypto/tls_openssl.c.orig	2015-09-27 19:02:05 UTC
 +++ src/crypto/tls_openssl.c
-@@ -2229,7 +2229,7 @@ static int tls_parse_pkcs12(struct tls_d
+@@ -919,7 +919,7 @@ void * tls_init(const struct tls_config 
  		}
- 
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_FIPS */
- 	if (certs) {
+ #endif /* CONFIG_FIPS */
--#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
- 		SSL_clear_chain_certs(ssl);
- 		while ((cert = sk_X509_pop(certs)) != NULL) {
- 			X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), buf,
-@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ static int tls_parse_pkcs12(struct tls_d
- 			/* Try to continue anyway */
- 		}
- 		sk_X509_free(certs);
--#ifndef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
-+#if !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
- 		res = SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl,
- 					   SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK |
- 					   SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR);
-@@ -2812,7 +2812,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_random(void *ssl_
- 	if (conn == NULL || keys == NULL)
- 		return -1;
- 	ssl = conn->ssl;
 -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
 +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
- 	if (ssl == NULL || ssl->s3 == NULL || ssl->session == NULL)
+ 		SSL_load_error_strings();
- 		return -1;
+ 		SSL_library_init();
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256
+@@ -1043,7 +1043,7 @@ void tls_deinit(void *ssl_ctx)
  
-@@ -2841,7 +2841,7 @@ int tls_connection_get_random(void *ssl_
+ 	tls_openssl_ref_count--;
- #ifndef CONFIG_FIPS
+ 	if (tls_openssl_ref_count == 0) {
- static int openssl_get_keyblock_size(SSL *ssl)
- {
 -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
 +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
- 	const EVP_CIPHER *c;
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- 	const EVP_MD *h;
+ 		ENGINE_cleanup();
- 	int md_size;
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE */
-@@ -2911,7 +2911,7 @@ static int openssl_tls_prf(struct tls_co
+@@ -3976,7 +3976,7 @@ int tls_connection_set_params(void *tls_
- 		   "mode");
+ 		engine_id = "pkcs11";
- 	return -1;
- #else /* CONFIG_FIPS */
--#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
- 	SSL *ssl;
- 	u8 *rnd;
- 	int ret = -1;
-@@ -3394,7 +3394,7 @@ int tls_connection_set_cipher_list(void
  
- 	wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "OpenSSL: cipher suites: %s", buf + 1);
- 
--#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
-+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && !defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
  #if defined(EAP_FAST) || defined(EAP_FAST_DYNAMIC) || defined(EAP_SERVER_FAST)
- 	if (os_strstr(buf, ":ADH-")) {
- 		/*
-@@ -3977,7 +3977,7 @@ static int tls_sess_sec_cb(SSL *s, void
- 	struct tls_connection *conn = arg;
- 	int ret;
- 
 -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L
 +#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
- 	if (conn == NULL || conn->session_ticket_cb == NULL)
+ 	if (params->flags & TLS_CONN_EAP_FAST) {
- 		return 0;
+ 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
- 
+ 			   "OpenSSL: Use TLSv1_method() for EAP-FAST");

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-src_utils_os__unix.c

@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
---- src/utils/os_unix.c.orig	2015-09-27 19:02:05 UTC
-+++ src/utils/os_unix.c
-@@ -214,17 +214,42 @@ static int os_daemon(int nochdir, int no
- #define os_daemon daemon
- #endif /* __APPLE__ */
- 
-+#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__)
-+#define FREE_DRAGON
-+#include <err.h>
-+#include <libutil.h>
-+#include <stdint.h>
-+#endif /* __FreeBSD__ || __DragonFly__ */
- 
- int os_daemonize(const char *pid_file)
- {
- #if defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__)
- 	return -1;
- #else /* defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__) */
-+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON
-+	pid_t otherpid;
-+	struct pidfh *pfh;
-+
-+	pfh = pidfile_open(pid_file, 0600, &otherpid);
-+	if (pfh == NULL) {
-+		if (errno == EEXIST) {
-+			errx(1, "Daemon already running, pid: %jd.",
-+			    (intmax_t)otherpid);
-+		}
-+		warn("Cannot open or create pidfile.");
-+	}
-+#endif /* FREE_DRAGON */
- 	if (os_daemon(0, 0)) {
- 		perror("daemon");
-+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON
-+		pidfile_remove(pfh);
-+#endif /* FREE_DRAGON */
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON
-+	pidfile_write(pfh);
-+#else
- 	if (pid_file) {
- 		FILE *f = fopen(pid_file, "w");
- 		if (f) {
-@@ -232,6 +257,7 @@ int os_daemonize(const char *pid_file)
- 			fclose(f);
- 		}
- 	}
-+#endif /* FREE_DRAGON */
- 
- 	return -0;
- #endif /* defined(__uClinux__) || defined(__sun__) */
-@@ -384,7 +410,7 @@ int os_setenv(const char *name, const ch
- 
- int os_unsetenv(const char *name)
- {
--#if defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__) || \
-+#if defined(FREE_DRAGON) || defined(__NetBSD__) || defined(__APPLE__) || \
-     defined(__OpenBSD__)
- 	unsetenv(name);
- 	return 0;
-@@ -445,7 +471,9 @@ int os_file_exists(const char *fname)
- int os_fdatasync(FILE *stream)
- {
- 	if (!fflush(stream)) {
--#ifndef __MACH__
-+#ifdef FREE_DRAGON
-+		return fsync(fileno(stream));
-+#elif !defined __MACH__
- 		return fdatasync(fileno(stream));
- #else /* __MACH__ */
- #ifdef F_FULLFSYNC

security/wpa_supplicant/files/patch-wpa__supplicant_main.c

@@ -1,6 +1,25 @@
---- wpa_supplicant/main.c.orig	2015-03-15 17:30:39 UTC
+--- wpa_supplicant/main.c.orig	2016-11-05 20:56:30 UTC
 +++ wpa_supplicant/main.c
-@@ -173,6 +173,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static void usage(void)
+ 	       "  -c = Configuration file\n"
+ 	       "  -C = ctrl_interface parameter (only used if -c is not)\n"
+ 	       "  -d = increase debugging verbosity (-dd even more)\n"
+-	       "  -D = driver name (can be multiple drivers: nl80211,wext)\n"
++	       "  -D = driver name (can be multiple drivers: bsd,wired)\n"
+ 	       "  -e = entropy file\n"
+ #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FILE
+ 	       "  -f = log output to debug file instead of stdout\n"
+@@ -105,8 +105,7 @@ static void usage(void)
+ 	       "  -W = wait for a control interface monitor before starting\n");
+ 
+ 	printf("example:\n"
+-	       "  wpa_supplicant -D%s -iwlan0 -c/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf\n",
+-	       wpa_drivers[0] ? wpa_drivers[0]->name : "nl80211");
++                "  wpa_supplicant -Dbsd -iwlan0 -c/etc/wpa_supplicant.conf\n");
+ #endif /* CONFIG_NO_STDOUT_DEBUG */
+ }
+ 
+@@ -199,6 +198,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  
  	wpa_supplicant_fd_workaround(1);
  
@@ -11,4 +30,4 @@
 +
  	for (;;) {
  		c = getopt(argc, argv,
- 			   "b:Bc:C:D:de:f:g:G:hi:I:KLm:No:O:p:P:qsTtuvW");
+ 			   "b:Bc:C:D:de:f:g:G:hi:I:KLMm:No:O:p:P:qsTtuvW");