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ports/security/openssl35/files/extra-patch-ktls
Bernard Spil a6e928d8c6 security/openssl35: Add new OpenSSL version with PQC 
* This is ALPHA level software, for testing only
* Adds Post-Quantum Crypto algorithms
2025-03-14 20:12:18 +01:00

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diff --git include/internal/ktls.h include/internal/ktls.h
index 95492fd065..3c82cae26b 100644
--- include/internal/ktls.h
+++ include/internal/ktls.h
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
# define OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_128
# define OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_256
# define OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13
+# ifdef TLS_CHACHA20_IV_LEN
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA
+# define OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+# endif
+# endif
typedef struct tls_enable ktls_crypto_info_t;
diff --git ssl/ktls.c ssl/ktls.c
index 79d980959e..e343d382cc 100644
--- ssl/ktls.c
+++ ssl/ktls.c
@@ -10,6 +10,67 @@
#include "ssl_local.h"
#include "internal/ktls.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
+ /*
+ * Count the number of records that were not processed yet from record boundary.
+ *
+ * This function assumes that there are only fully formed records read in the
+ * record layer. If read_ahead is enabled, then this might be false and this
+ * function will fail.
+ */
+static int count_unprocessed_records(SSL *s)
+{
+ SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
+ PACKET pkt, subpkt;
+ int count = 0;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, rbuf->left))
+ return -1;
+
+ while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
+ /* Skip record type and version */
+ if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 3))
+ return -1;
+
+ /* Read until next record */
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt))
+ return -1;
+
+ count += 1;
+ }
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The kernel cannot offload receive if a partial TLS record has been read.
+ * Check the read buffer for unprocessed records. If the buffer contains a
+ * partial record, fail and return 0. Otherwise, update the sequence
+ * number at *rec_seq for the count of unprocessed records and return 1.
+ */
+static int check_rx_read_ahead(SSL *s, unsigned char *rec_seq)
+{
+ int bit, count_unprocessed;
+
+ count_unprocessed = count_unprocessed_records(s);
+ if (count_unprocessed < 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* increment the crypto_info record sequence */
+ while (count_unprocessed) {
+ for (bit = 7; bit >= 0; bit--) { /* increment */
+ ++rec_seq[bit];
+ if (rec_seq[bit] != 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ count_unprocessed--;
+
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
#if defined(__FreeBSD__)
# include "crypto/cryptodev.h"
@@ -37,6 +98,10 @@ int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
case SSL_AES128GCM:
case SSL_AES256GCM:
return 1;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+ return 1;
+# endif
case SSL_AES128:
case SSL_AES256:
if (s->ext.use_etm)
@@ -55,9 +120,9 @@ int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
}
/* Function to configure kernel TLS structure */
-int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
+int ktls_configure_crypto(SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
void *rl_sequence, ktls_crypto_info_t *crypto_info,
- unsigned char **rec_seq, unsigned char *iv,
+ int is_tx, unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *key, unsigned char *mac_key,
size_t mac_secret_size)
{
@@ -71,6 +136,12 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
else
crypto_info->iv_len = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN;
break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
+ case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+ crypto_info->cipher_algorithm = CRYPTO_CHACHA20_POLY1305;
+ crypto_info->iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv_length(dd);
+ break;
+# endif
case SSL_AES128:
case SSL_AES256:
switch (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac) {
@@ -101,11 +172,11 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
crypto_info->tls_vminor = (s->version & 0x000000ff);
# ifdef TCP_RXTLS_ENABLE
memcpy(crypto_info->rec_seq, rl_sequence, sizeof(crypto_info->rec_seq));
- if (rec_seq != NULL)
- *rec_seq = crypto_info->rec_seq;
+ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->rec_seq))
+ return 0;
# else
- if (rec_seq != NULL)
- *rec_seq = NULL;
+ if (!is_tx)
+ return 0;
# endif
return 1;
};
@@ -154,15 +225,20 @@ int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
}
/* Function to configure kernel TLS structure */
-int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
+int ktls_configure_crypto(SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
void *rl_sequence, ktls_crypto_info_t *crypto_info,
- unsigned char **rec_seq, unsigned char *iv,
+ int is_tx, unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *key, unsigned char *mac_key,
size_t mac_secret_size)
{
unsigned char geniv[12];
unsigned char *iiv = iv;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
+ if (!is_tx)
+ return 0;
+# endif
+
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) {
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv(dd, geniv,
@@ -186,8 +262,8 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.key, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c));
memcpy(crypto_info->gcm128.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
- if (rec_seq != NULL)
- *rec_seq = crypto_info->gcm128.rec_seq;
+ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->gcm128.rec_seq))
+ return 0;
return 1;
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_GCM_256
@@ -201,8 +277,8 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.key, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c));
memcpy(crypto_info->gcm256.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
- if (rec_seq != NULL)
- *rec_seq = crypto_info->gcm256.rec_seq;
+ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->gcm256.rec_seq))
+ return 0;
return 1;
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_AES_CCM_128
@@ -216,8 +292,8 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.key, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c));
memcpy(crypto_info->ccm128.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
- if (rec_seq != NULL)
- *rec_seq = crypto_info->ccm128.rec_seq;
+ if (!is_tx && !check_rx_read_ahead(s, crypto_info->ccm128.rec_seq))
+ return 0;
return 1;
# endif
# ifdef OPENSSL_KTLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305
@@ -231,8 +307,10 @@ int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c));
memcpy(crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.rec_seq, rl_sequence,
TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305_REC_SEQ_SIZE);
- if (rec_seq != NULL)
- *rec_seq = crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.rec_seq;
+ if (!is_tx
+ && !check_rx_read_ahead(s,
+ crypto_info->chacha20poly1305.rec_seq))
+ return 0;
return 1;
# endif
default:
diff --git ssl/record/ssl3_record.c ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
index d8ef018741..63caac080f 100644
--- ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
+++ ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
@@ -185,18 +185,23 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
int imac_size;
size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j;
PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt;
- int is_ktls_left;
+ int using_ktls;
SSL_MAC_BUF *macbufs = NULL;
int ret = -1;
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
- is_ktls_left = (SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) > 0);
max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
if (max_recs == 0)
max_recs = 1;
sess = s->session;
+ /*
+ * KTLS reads full records. If there is any data left,
+ * then it is from before enabling ktls.
+ */
+ using_ktls = BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf) == 0;
+
do {
thisrr = &rr[num_recs];
@@ -361,7 +366,9 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
}
}
- if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) {
+ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
+ && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
+ && !using_ktls) {
if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
|| !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
@@ -391,7 +398,13 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
}
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
- if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) {
+ size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+
+ /* KTLS strips the inner record type. */
+ if (using_ktls)
+ len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+
+ if (thisrr->length > len) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
@@ -409,7 +422,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
#endif
/* KTLS may use all of the buffer */
- if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !is_ktls_left)
+ if (using_ktls)
len = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf);
if (thisrr->length > len) {
@@ -518,11 +531,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
return 1;
}
- /*
- * KTLS reads full records. If there is any data left,
- * then it is from before enabling ktls
- */
- if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !is_ktls_left)
+ if (using_ktls)
goto skip_decryption;
if (s->read_hash != NULL) {
@@ -677,21 +686,29 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)
&& s->enc_read_ctx != NULL
&& thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
- size_t end;
+ /*
+ * The following logic are irrelevant in KTLS: the kernel provides
+ * unprotected record and thus record type represent the actual
+ * content type, and padding is already removed and thisrr->type and
+ * thisrr->length should have the correct values.
+ */
+ if (!using_ktls) {
+ size_t end;
- if (thisrr->length == 0
- || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
- SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
- goto end;
+ if (thisrr->length == 0
+ || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ /* Strip trailing padding */
+ for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0;
+ end--)
+ continue;
+
+ thisrr->length = end;
+ thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end];
}
-
- /* Strip trailing padding */
- for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0;
- end--)
- continue;
-
- thisrr->length = end;
- thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end];
if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA
&& thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT
&& thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) {
@@ -700,7 +717,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
}
if (s->msg_callback)
s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE,
- &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
+ &thisrr->type, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg);
}
/*
@@ -723,8 +740,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
* Therefore we have to rely on KTLS to check the plaintext length
* limit in the kernel.
*/
- if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH
- && (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) || is_ktls_left)) {
+ if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH && !using_ktls) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto end;
}
diff --git ssl/ssl_local.h ssl/ssl_local.h
index 5471e900b8..79ced2f468 100644
--- ssl/ssl_local.h
+++ ssl/ssl_local.h
@@ -2760,9 +2760,9 @@ __owur int ssl_log_secret(SSL *ssl, const char *label,
/* ktls.c */
int ktls_check_supported_cipher(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c,
const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd);
-int ktls_configure_crypto(const SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
+int ktls_configure_crypto(SSL *s, const EVP_CIPHER *c, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd,
void *rl_sequence, ktls_crypto_info_t *crypto_info,
- unsigned char **rec_seq, unsigned char *iv,
+ int is_tx, unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *key, unsigned char *mac_key,
size_t mac_secret_size);
# endif
diff --git ssl/t1_enc.c ssl/t1_enc.c
index 237a19cd93..900ba14fbd 100644
--- ssl/t1_enc.c
+++ ssl/t1_enc.c
@@ -98,42 +98,6 @@ static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, size_t num)
return ret;
}
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
- /*
- * Count the number of records that were not processed yet from record boundary.
- *
- * This function assumes that there are only fully formed records read in the
- * record layer. If read_ahead is enabled, then this might be false and this
- * function will fail.
- */
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
-static int count_unprocessed_records(SSL *s)
-{
- SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
- PACKET pkt, subpkt;
- int count = 0;
-
- if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, rbuf->buf + rbuf->offset, rbuf->left))
- return -1;
-
- while (PACKET_remaining(&pkt) > 0) {
- /* Skip record type and version */
- if (!PACKET_forward(&pkt, 3))
- return -1;
-
- /* Read until next record */
- if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(&pkt, &subpkt))
- return -1;
-
- count += 1;
- }
-
- return count;
-}
-# endif
-#endif
-
-
int tls_provider_set_tls_params(SSL *s, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
const EVP_CIPHER *ciph,
const EVP_MD *md)
@@ -201,12 +165,7 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
int reuse_dd = 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info;
- unsigned char *rec_seq;
void *rl_sequence;
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
- int count_unprocessed;
- int bit;
-# endif
BIO *bio;
#endif
@@ -473,30 +432,11 @@ int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
else
rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
- if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, c, dd, rl_sequence, &crypto_info, &rec_seq,
- iv, key, ms, *mac_secret_size))
+ if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, c, dd, rl_sequence, &crypto_info,
+ which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, iv, key, ms,
+ *mac_secret_size))
goto skip_ktls;
- if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) {
-# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX
- count_unprocessed = count_unprocessed_records(s);
- if (count_unprocessed < 0)
- goto skip_ktls;
-
- /* increment the crypto_info record sequence */
- while (count_unprocessed) {
- for (bit = 7; bit >= 0; bit--) { /* increment */
- ++rec_seq[bit];
- if (rec_seq[bit] != 0)
- break;
- }
- count_unprocessed--;
- }
-# else
- goto skip_ktls;
-# endif
- }
-
/* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) {
if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
diff --git ssl/tls13_enc.c ssl/tls13_enc.c
index 12388922e3..eaab0e2a74 100644
--- ssl/tls13_enc.c
+++ ssl/tls13_enc.c
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS) && defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
ktls_crypto_info_t crypto_info;
+ void *rl_sequence;
BIO *bio;
#endif
@@ -688,8 +689,7 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
s->statem.enc_write_state = ENC_WRITE_STATE_VALID;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
# if defined(OPENSSL_KTLS_TLS13)
- if (!(which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
- || !(which & SSL3_CC_APPLICATION)
+ if (!(which & SSL3_CC_APPLICATION)
|| (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) == 0)
goto skip_ktls;
@@ -705,7 +705,10 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
if (!ktls_check_supported_cipher(s, cipher, ciph_ctx))
goto skip_ktls;
- bio = s->wbio;
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+ bio = s->wbio;
+ else
+ bio = s->rbio;
if (!ossl_assert(bio != NULL)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -713,18 +716,26 @@ int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which)
}
/* All future data will get encrypted by ktls. Flush the BIO or skip ktls */
- if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
- goto skip_ktls;
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) {
+ if (BIO_flush(bio) <= 0)
+ goto skip_ktls;
+ }
/* configure kernel crypto structure */
- if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, cipher, ciph_ctx,
- RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer),
- &crypto_info, NULL, iv, key, NULL, 0))
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+ rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+ else
+ rl_sequence = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer);
+
+ if (!ktls_configure_crypto(s, cipher, ciph_ctx, rl_sequence, &crypto_info,
+ which & SSL3_CC_WRITE, iv, key, NULL, 0))
goto skip_ktls;
/* ktls works with user provided buffers directly */
- if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))
- ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+ if (BIO_set_ktls(bio, &crypto_info, which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) {
+ if (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)
+ ssl3_release_write_buffer(s);
+ }
skip_ktls:
# endif
#endif
diff --git test/sslapitest.c test/sslapitest.c
index 2911d6e94b..faf2eec2bc 100644
--- test/sslapitest.c
+++ test/sslapitest.c
@@ -1243,7 +1243,7 @@ static int execute_test_ktls(int cis_ktls, int sis_ktls,
#if defined(OPENSSL_NO_KTLS_RX)
rx_supported = 0;
#else
- rx_supported = (tls_version != TLS1_3_VERSION);
+ rx_supported = 1;
#endif
if (!cis_ktls || !rx_supported) {
if (!TEST_false(BIO_get_ktls_recv(clientssl->rbio)))
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