ports/security/pgpin/files/CHANGES
Dirk Meyer cb9a0ddd38 PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) is a public key encryption pack-
age to protect E-mail and data files.  It lets you  commu-
nicate  securely  with  people  you've  never met, with no
secure channels needed for prior exchange of  keys.   It's
well featured and fast, with sophisticated key management,
digital signatures, data compression, and  good  ergonomic
design.

Contributors:
  Matthias Bruestle for the myetsid feature.
  Lutz Donnerhacke for the pgp2.6.3in development.
  Ingmar Camphausen, Thomas Roessler, a.o. for extensive testing.

WWW: http://www.in-ca.individual.net/
FTP: ftp://ftp.fu-berlin.de/doc/IN/IN-CA/pgp/pgp263in/files/pgp263in.changes
2001-03-31 11:36:43 +00:00

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20010322:
- Protect against the Czech attack of modified secret key files. (Cool!)
- Protect against MPI computing errors. (more programm errors than Bellcore)
20001006:
- Alter the ARJ signature to the current version.
- Prevent automatic renaming of command line arguments
used for file names (+batchmode).
199990902:
- Up to 32bit KeyID can be selected.
- Allow batchmode to revoke certificates (and keys :-{).
199971007:
- Bugfix of the previous bugfix. I'm an idiot unable to program in C.
- language.txt (German part) brushed up.
199971006:
- Bugfix of ordinary PGP: -kc failed to deal correctly w/ DSS signatures.
199970905:
- Bugfix: Compile under MSDOS and OSF.
- Corrected some spelling errors.
- ESC is plain text, too.
- Somewhat more verbose output.
- 8192 bit RSA support
199970828:
- Certificates of unknown pubkeys are suppressed.
(New Option UNKNOWN_CERTS (On/Off))
- pgp -kvv shows the quality of user identification.
199970729:
- Bugfix: Validity period is read correctly from the key ring.
199970529:
- Certificates from revoked keys are invalid.
199970513:
- Certificates from unknown users are handled correctly.
199970512:
- Certificate revocations are correctly handled and displayed.
199970418:
- support of a separate "encrypt to self" id
- certificates signed with compromised keys are invalid now
- support of certificate revocation certificates:
You can revoke your ID without loosing your key.
199970404:
- try the corresponding key, if the key of the wrong purpose is used,
so 'pgp -se file myname -u myname' will automatically choose the right
keys.
- SIGN keys can be used to decrypt, but PGP will warn the user.
- The language modul could not distinguish two strings, so changed them.
- Recommendations for key generating changed: Larger keys, userid options.
199970403:
- 2.6.3ia patch included
- bugfixes
199970402:
- While certifying a key the certifier can specify how (s)he checked
the user's real identity. (This question is quite different to
the question whether the key was presented by this person or not!)
- SIGN keys cannot encrypt.
- SIGN keys cannot decrypt (so you can't read it!)
- ENCR keys cannot sign or certify.
- Signatures or certificates by ENCR keys are invalid. (even self signed)
- Signatures or certificates are invalid, if their timestamp is not covered
by the validity period of the public key. (too young or too old)
- Expired keys are kept but marked. (same for keys valid in future)
- Purpose and expire of a key are set while generating the key.
It is derived from the userid as described in the policy of the IN-CH.
References:
http://www.in-ca.individual.net/
ftp://ftp.iks-jena.de/pub/mitarb/lutz/crypt/software/pgp/
Diffs and full source (tgz)
*.asc are detached signatures.
Contributors:
Matthias Bruestle for the myetsid feature.
Lutz Donnerhacke for the pgp2.6.3in development.
Ingmar Camphausen, Thomas Roessler, a.o. for extensive testing.
Todo:
- New trust models for revoked certificates.
- Time stamping features (using the Eternity Logfile:
http://www.iks-jena.de/mitarb/lutz/logfile/)
- Support of EBP and PGP5.0 features.
- Better internal key management for faster access.
- Direct support for keyserver issues.