security/openssl111: Security hardening update to 1.1.1c

MFH:		2019Q2

security/openssl111/Makefile

@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@
 # $FreeBSD$
 
 PORTNAME=	openssl
-PORTVERSION=	1.1.1b
+PORTVERSION=	1.1.1c
-PORTREVISION=	1
 CATEGORIES=	security devel
 MASTER_SITES=	https://www.openssl.org/source/ \
 		ftp://ftp.cert.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/

security/openssl111/distinfo

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-TIMESTAMP = 1551251313
+TIMESTAMP = 1559070548
-SHA256 (openssl-1.1.1b.tar.gz) = 5c557b023230413dfb0756f3137a13e6d726838ccd1430888ad15bfb2b43ea4b
+SHA256 (openssl-1.1.1c.tar.gz) = f6fb3079ad15076154eda9413fed42877d668e7069d9b87396d0804fdb3f4c90
-SIZE (openssl-1.1.1b.tar.gz) = 8213737
+SIZE (openssl-1.1.1c.tar.gz) = 8864262

security/openssl111/files/patch-CVE-2019-1543

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From f426625b6ae9a7831010750490a5f0ad689c5ba3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2019 14:39:15 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305
-
-ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for
-every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV)
-should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and
-front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it
-also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case
-only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are
-ignored.
-
-It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique.
-Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious
-confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the
-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to
-the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique
-nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a
-reused nonce.
-
-Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the
-integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the
-integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further
-affected.
-
-Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe
-because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user
-applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce
-length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable.
-
-CVE-2019-1543
-
-Fixes #8345
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8406)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 2a3d0ee9d59156c48973592331404471aca886d6)
----
- crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c | 4 +++-
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c b/crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
-index c1917bb86a6..d3e2c622a1b 100644
---- crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c.orig
-+++ crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
-@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ typedef struct {
- 
- #define data(ctx)   ((EVP_CHACHA_KEY *)(ctx)->cipher_data)
- 
-+#define CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN     12
-+
- static int chacha_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
-                            const unsigned char user_key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
-                            const unsigned char iv[CHACHA_CTR_SIZE], int enc)
-@@ -533,7 +535,7 @@ static int chacha20_poly1305_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg,
-         return 1;
- 
-     case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
--        if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA_CTR_SIZE)
-+        if (arg <= 0 || arg > CHACHA20_POLY1305_MAX_IVLEN)
-             return 0;
-         actx->nonce_len = arg;
-         return 1;

security/openssl111/pkg-plist

@@ -1546,6 +1546,7 @@ man/man1/x509.1.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1.3.gz
+%%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_engine.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_poly1305.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/EVP_PKEY_get0_siphash.3.gz
@@ -2455,11 +2456,13 @@ man/man1/x509.1.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_new.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_new_method.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP.3.gz
+%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_SSLv23.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_add_none.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP.3.gz
+%%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2.3.gz
 %%MAN3%%man/man3/RSA_padding_check_SSLv23.3.gz